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INTUITION AND INTELLIGENCE: 
ON BERGSON IN EUGENI D'ORS 
NELSON R. ORR[NGER 
No penetrating study of Ors's thought can neglect his relation-
ship with Bergson. For the fragmentary, discontinuous "gloses" 
("glosas") in which Ors prefers to expose his ideas cannot be un-
derstood without comparison to the smooth-rolling intuitions of 
Bergson, to whom they respond. Ors's biographer EnricJardí, not 
a comparatist, argues Ors's heavy indebtedness to Bergson, I while 
Ors's student José Luis L. Aranguren, though not denying the 
debt, regards Bergson as rather the negative stimulus needed by 
I [n Eugenio d'Ors. Obray vida, Barcelona, 1967, 344,]ardí notes Bergson's 
presence in the structure of LafilosoJía de! bombre que Irabaja.y quejl/ega, with its 
contrast between Power and Resistance, Spirit and Nature. Moreover, Bergson 
also affected Ors's fiction (Jardí, 207-208). We should also note a brief allusion to 
Bergson in his 1907 article, from the Closari de Xenil/s, written in Catalan and 
titled "Le Dantec and Science as a Standard" ("Le Dantec i la Ciència com a Me-
sura") in which he points out the decline of Positivism. Le Dantec, a Positivist 
philosopher, very famous then, is today remembered mostly through a single sta-
tement, "Sans phosphore, pas de pensée". Ors states, "The times - Bergson, a new 
Sun, is rising - are not favorable to Le Dantec" . In Eugeni d'Ors, Obra Catalana 
completa. Closari 1906-1910, Barcelona, Ed. Selecta, 1950,626. The Catalan text 
reads, "L'hora - Bergson, sol nou, es lleva - no és favorable a Le Dantec". Also of 
interest is anothercomment in the sa me Closari dated 1908 when ürs took part in 
the Heidelberg International Congress of Philosophy. He points out Bergson's 
absence, becau se ofhis ill health, he will be absent but sorely missed: "Ell serà, ja 
es veu, desd'ara, el rei de la festa ... Tot Heidelberg va ple del seu nom" (809) ("He 
will be, obviously, the king of this meeting. All Heidelberg resounds with his 
name", ibid., 809). Ors points out that German translations ofBergson's works are 
to be seen in the windows of all the bookstores. It is impossible, he states, to look 
in any direction without finding "Henri Bergson - Materie und Ceddchtnis ... Henri 
Bergson - Materie IInd Ceddchlnis " (ibid., 309). 
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Ors to write his doctoral dissertation and to attain philosophical 
independence. 2 Ors himself confesses in print his ambivalence to-
wards Bergson, felt even while studying with him at the Collège de 
France around 1909. \ Recently, though, Jaume Roura Roca has 
documented Ors's unlimited enthusiasm for Bergson as late as 
1908. Ors's handwritten memorandum "La crítica i els mètodes 
de la ciència contemporània" contains a surprisingly lengthy, lau-
datory exposition of Bergson's epistemology. This unpublished 
manusc:ript mentions the Essai sur les donnés immédiates de la consci-
ence, Matii:re et memoire, even L'Évolution créatrice, which came out 
in 1907. Ors applauds Bergson for countering mechanistic posi-
tivism, based on the category of space, with his own anti-intellec-
tualistic "temporalism". Moreover, he relates Bergson's mysti-
cism to Carlyle's, inf1uential on himselC How far do es he really 
move beyond Bergson when he attains the new intellectualism of 
his maturity? The present study attempts to show through precise 
comparisons the presence ofBergson in Ors's conceptions of in-
tuition and intelligence, two notions !ying at the heart ofhis phi-
losophy. 
Long before meeting Bergson, Ors had corne to believe that 
Catalonia had never experienced the Renaissance with the rest of 
2 On Ors's unpublished thesis Las aporÍas de Zenón de Eleay la noción moder-
na del Espacio- Tiempo (1914), see J.L.L. Aranguren, La filosoJía de EI/genio d'Ors, 
Madrid, 1981, 251. 
J U-II/m-il (1921), in NI/evo glosario, I (MCMXX-MCMXXVI), Madrid, 
1947, 462 . Henceforth all references from the NI/evo glosario appear parenthesi-
zed in our text with date of essay cited, abbreviation NG, volume in Roman nu-
merals, and page in Arabic numbers . References from the Novísimo glosario 
(MCMXXXXIV-MCMXXXXV) Madrid, 1946, are parenthesized with date of es-
say, abbreviation NOG, and pa ge number. 
4 J. Roura Roca, "La etapa barcelonesa de Eugenio d 'Ors", in Aclas del III Se-
minario de Hisloria de la FilosoJía Española. ed. A. Heredia Soriano, Salamanca, 
1983,357. 
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Europe. Roura Roca thus explains Ors's resolve, expressed in 
1909, to fill the cultural and scientific void by importing to Barce-
lona what he called "scientism", the European movement which, 
as against positivism, encouraged the convergence of philosophy 
and science (361). Hence the uneasiness which tempered Ors's ad-
miration of Bergson and which prompted him to draw from his 
teacher certain aspects ofin tellectualism criticized by Bergson. To 
view reality with Bergson as unpredictable, like the f1ux of time, 
seemed tantamount to Ors to denying every cultural norm and to 
admitting the victory of spontaneity (1921, NC, 1,462). On the 
other hand, this vehement reaction against Bergson masked a se-
cret attraction to his thinking. Ors came to view his own intellec-
tualism as the mast of Ulysses' ship to which he had himself 
bound to resist the sirens' song (1944, NOC, 348). In Bergson's 
"music" Ors perceived the sinuosity of the Oriental f1ute with its 
"venomous charm", antagonistic to the "stern Iyre" of rationalis-
tic c1assicism. At sessions of the Société Française de Philosophie, 
Ors noted a campaign afoot to restore the intellectualistic tradi-
tion handed down to the West by Pythagoras (theorist ofmusical 
intervals on the Iyre) . The restoration would undo the subtle plot 
ofjin de siède France against intelligence. The new intellectualists, 
however, thought it counterproductive to repeat rationalistic 
commonplaces so effectively refuted by Bergson in the negative 
portion ofhis philosophy (1947, NC, III, 806). Accordingly, Ors 
decided tlut in the philosophical tradition extending from Des-
cartes to Bergson, he would have to move back toward Descartes. 
"We are returning from roman tic intuitionism to c1assical in tel-
lectualism, although the intellectualism to which we aspire may 
need to be broadened and enriched with the booty of con quest in 
the earlier adventure" (1925, NC, I, 1026).; Seeing himself so en-
; "Estamos regresando del intuitivismo rom;Íntico ,li cUsico intelectua-
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riched by Bergson's philosophy, Ors should not be taken too lite-
rally when labeling Bergson a romantic "obscurantist", favoring 
the unconscious over consciousness, the biological over the logi-
cal, life over reason (1923, NC, l, 634-5). Bergson often employs 
ideas garnered from the intellectualistic tradition and borrowed as 
he formulates them by Ors. Both Bergson and Ors combine intui-
tion and dialectics in their essays. Both hold up human wholeness 
as the goal of philosophy. Between them seems to exist merely a 
difference in degree, with intuition predominant in Bergson and 
dialectics in Ors. To perceive this relationship between them, we 
need only compare what Bergson means by intuition with what 
Ors conceives as intelligence. 
lntuition, according to Bergson's Matière et mémoire, denotes 
the basic property of pure, essential perception, the quality of es-
tablishing immediate contact with the object, allowing penetra-
tion into it, and the vision of it as a continuum, a becoming. The 
subject, through an effort of sympathy, transfers himselfto the in-
side ofthe object and intuits it in flux." Analytical thinking, on the 
other hand, leads the object to the subject, seeking to make use of 
its image. This form or cognition, which Bergson usually calls in-
telligence, is the instrument or Homo faber, material and moral 
maker of things and of himself.' In Bergson, despite expressions 
seeming to favor intuition over intelligence, both types ofknow-
ledge complement one another. To obtain an intuition of reality, 
a spiritual sympathy with its intimacy, the author of La Pensée el fe 
mOlf7JClnl thinks it necessary to learn about the real beforehand 
lismo, .lunque el intelectualisJ110 a que aspiramos haya de serya ampliado y enri-
quccido con el botín de lo conquistado en la aventura anterior". 
h Jean Theau, La Crilique bergsonienne du concepl, Toulouse, 1968, 136, 143 .. 
; Henri Bergson, La PellSée el fe mOllvanl, in Oeuvres, ed. André Robinet, Paris, 
1970,1325. Henceforth all references from Bergson, except for the one in n. 11, 
infrJ, come from this edition Jnd Jppear parenthesized in our text. 
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through a series of practical contacts with its surface aspects 
(Theau, 147). In the debate between realism and idealism, Berg-
son prefers the means between the two extremes. Guided by his 
"sens commun", he remarks in the preface to Matiere et mémoire 
that matter consists for him of a collection of images; and that 
images, as he understands them, have an existence half-way bet-
ween what realists call "things" and idealists "représentations" 
(161 ). 
Let us now compare Ors's conceptions ofintuition and intel-
ligence. In La filosofía del hombre que trabaja y que juega, his notion 
of intuition precisely coincides with Bergson's. For the Catalan 
philosopher, intuition is "the faculty of perceiving ... solely the in-
dividual concrete" . X Here Ors echoes L'Évolution créatrice, where 
Bergson se es intuition and intelligence as two "faculties" needed 
in every epistemology (646), and where he compares intuition to 
the visi on of the artist, trying to capture the individual's in-
nermost being through sympathy (645). In this essay, though, 
Bergson marvels at the potential of intuition for allowing sympa-
thetic communication between the subject and all living beings. 
Intuition dilates the consciousness, immerses it in the river of en-
dless creativity, oflife itself(646). If an individual, with his cons-
ciousness so dilate d, discovers a new truth, he has what Bergson 
calls an original intuition ("intuition originelle"). This notion has 
affected Ors so deeply, that out ofit emerges his own new intellec-
tualism. In short, Bergson's intuitionism has unexpectedly pro-
vided an effective arm to the enemy camp!9 
8 " . • • la facultad de percibir ... únicamente lo concreto individual" (Lafiloso-
fía del hombre que trabajay quejuega. Antologíafilosójica de Eugenio d'Ors, ed . R. Ru-
cabado y J. Farran, Barcelona, n. d., 121). Hereafter references from this work ap-
pear parenthesized in our text with abbreviation FHTJ and page number. 
9 Diego Ruiz notes that in a private conversation in Paris, Bergson told Ors 
that his own anti-intellectualism was irreconcilable with Ors 's neo-intellectua-
lism; that Bergson felt himselfin possession ofthe truth ; but that Eastern peoples, 
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In the lecture "L'Intuition philosophique" delivered in Bo-
logna in 1911, Bergson explains "original intuition" and applies it 
to Berkeley, whom Ors admires as the first modern idealist (1944, 
NOC, 253). In every philosophical system, amid the many doc-
trines borrowed from others, lies an original insight. Unable to 
define it with precision, Bergson recommends intuiting it, assum-
ing the mental attitude ofthe philosopherwho had it, trying to see 
what he saw. The original intuition, though implying a den iaI of 
received ideas, can only be articulated in pre-existing concepts. 
Bergson offers the example of Berkeley's new theory of vision: 
whereas Descartes and Locke, in physical cognition, insist on the 
distinction between objective qualities (figure, motion, shape) 
and subjective qualities (color, odor, sound), Berkeley holds that 
both types of qualities, inseparable from one another, lie in the 
mind. Esse est percipi. This original intuition, Bergson thinks, af. 
fects the rest of Berkeley's thought, otherwise traceable to differ-
ent philosophers. Hence, in the light of the notion that all physi-
cal knowledge is subjective, how can we understand Berkeley's 
idealism? When Berkeley argues that matter is nothing but a co-
l1ection of ideas, according to Bergson, he is saying that 
matter is coextensive to our representation ; that it has no inside, no underside ; 
that it conceals nothing, contains nothing; that it possesses neither powers nor 
hidden virtues of any kind ; that it is displayed on a surface, and that it holds eve-
rything, at every in stant, in what it presents . The word "idea" normally denotes an 
existence of that kind, ". a completedly actualized existence whose being is only 
the same as its appearance , while the word "th ing" lets us think of a reality which 
woúld also be a storehouse of possibilities.1u 
whose metaphysical tradition his own theses continued, always fared poorly in 
the struggle with the West, whose world-view Ors was continuing (FHTj, 164). 
\O "".[que]la matière est coextensive à notre représentation ; qu'elle n'a pas 
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Berkeley, as a result, prefers to call material bodies "ideas" rather 
than "things". Matter, seen as nothing but "ideas", contains 
nothing within its elf. No general idea, no abs tracti on can be 
drawn out ofit. Bergson goes further, showing how Berkeley's ori-
ginal intuition influences his thinking on man and God. Matter, 
ma de ofideas, requires an intelligent Cause, aPrime Mover. God, 
Who undoubtedly exists, leaves the imprint of the "ideas" in each 
man, an unquestionably existing will, creaselessly limited by Di-
vine Wíll (1346-55). 
Keeping in mind Bergson's idea of "original intuition" with 
his example ofBerkeley, we shall see how idea and example form 
part ofOrs's philosophy. He subscribes to the theory of"original 
intuition". As against scholars who question the originality ofBer-
nat Metge, Ors discovers his "fundamental, seminal, intuition, 
the posture, the stress",11 in his unique combination of piety and 
irony, his agility in the pro and contra of dialogue, the playful im-
pression he gives of half-adherence to ideas (FH1), 88-89). Qrs's 
most explícit application of Bergson's concepts con cerns 
"Azorín": 
Bergson said one day to philosophers meeting in Bologna that every philoso-
pher's doctrine could be reduced, insofar as it held anything personal and origi-
nal, to a parent intuition, and that the latter could be revealed in a few words, in 
one word alone. Let my friends take up the chare that Bergson has set for them: 
what an illuminating chore they will find it! The structure o~" AzorÍn"'s thought 
can be wholly sketched around a singular center, which can probably be summed 
d'intérieur, pas de dessous; qu'elle ne cache rien,.ne renferme rien; qu'elle ne pos-
sède ni puissances ni virtualités d'aucune espèce; qu'elle est étalée en surface et 
qu'elle tient tout entière, à tout instant, dans ce qu'elle donne. Le mot «idée .. dé-
signe d'ordinaire une existence de ce genre, ... une existence complètement réali-
sée, dont l'être ne fait qu'un avec le paraitre, tandis le mot «chose .. nous fait penser 
à une réalité qui serait en même temps un réservoir de possibilités". 
II " ... intuición fundamental y matriz, la posición, el acento" . 
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up as its characteristic intuition orJl'nsiti7Ji!V, in its emphasis on the high value or 
this (I921, NC, I, 545-46).12 
In both applications ofBergson's notion of original intuition, Ors 
stresses less than the French vitalist the system ofideas elucidated 
by the intuition, and prefers to note its esthetic and practical im-
plications . 
Considerations ofbeauty and utility mark the "original in tu i-
tion" ofOrs's own philosophy, "figurative thinking". Aranguren 
se es this invention as Ors's attempt to supersede the opposition 
between intellectualism and intuitionism (84). In fact, Ors seems 
to be synthesizing Bergson's mental style with the intellectualist 
Berkeley.'s as described by Bergson. "Figurative thinking" signifies 
a mode of cognition aspiring to capture the direct expression and 
pure vision of the object at once, an expression and vision irrepla-
cea ble by any other.1.I This means "thinkingwith the eyes" or aim-
ing for a concrete generalization. l < Perception of this living idea is 
what Ors terms Seny . Instead of limiting this Catalan word to its 
usual connotation of "common sense", "savvy", he expands ifs 
meaning to embrace that ofFrench sagesse and even more (FHTj, 
120-21). For Bergson, sagesse means efficacy in practical matters. 
12 "Dijo Bergson un día a los filósofos reunidos en Bolonia que la doctrina de 
cada filósofo podía reducirse, en lo que tenía de personal originalidad, a una in-
tuición matriz, y ésta revelarse en una s pocas palabras , en una sola palabra. Bus-
quen este trabajo de Bergson mis amigos: icuantas luces hallaran en él! La estruc-
tura del pensamiento de Azorín puede dibujarse entera, en torno a un centro úni-
co, que se cifrara en su intuición característica de la sensibilidad, en su pondera-
ción del valor de ella". 
13 On "figurative thinking", see Aranguren, 85, andJorge M. Ayala, "Filoso-
fía y concepción de la historia en Eugenio d'Ors", in Acras de/III Seminario de His-
toria. de la Filosofía Española, 368. 
14 Eugenio d'Ors, Glosas. Pdginas del Glosari de Xmius (1906-1917), tro Alfon-
so Maseras, Madrid, 1920, 284. 
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Good sense, regarded by him as a civic virtue, displays two sides: 
on the one hand, an active attitude of intelligence; on the other 
hand, the self-defiance ofintelligence which recognizes its sub-in-
tellectual roots. l ; Ors, though , eschews Bergson's anti-intellec-
tualism. Sagesse he interprets as a balance ofintellectual and moral 
forces, in which empirical elements, retained and not rejected, be-
corne integrated within orderly intellectual patterns. Ors's word 
Seny amounts to noüs, "mind" or "intelligence" in pre-Aristotelian 
Greek, a concept encompassing reason, logic, good taste, balance, 
and sensitivity. Seny, so understood, constitutes, the central no-
tion of Ors's philosophy of man the worker and player. Seny in-
corporates Bergsonian intuitionof concrete reality into modern 
discursive reason (FHT}, 121). As between intuition and reason, 
Ors hoIds the Iatter superior within the broader framework of 
Seny. This preference for rationality explains certain propensities 
of Ors's thinking which bear almost a norninalistic Berkeleyan 
stamp: 1.) a will to philosophical transparency which reaches the 
point of viewing philosophy as a system of concrete ideas; 2.) a 
rnistrust (though not a denial) of the ineffable, of change, of infin-
ity; 3.) a love offinite, discrete, discontinuous realities perceived 
as such by intelligence, as opposed to the continuity of durée réelle 
pursued by Bergson's intuition. 
Bergson compares matter, as conceived by Berkeley, to a fine, 
transparent film placed between man and God. Transparent as 
long as philosophers leave it alone, it grows opa que when they in-
terpose words like substance, force, and res extensa between man 
and God (1356). Ors, though not averse to the use ofconcepts like 
substance and force, like Berkeley appreciates transparency, the 
virtue ofthe Iens which "admits, without opaque interference, the 
I; Henri Bergson, "Le Bon se ns et les étud es classiques" (1985) , in Milil/1,~CJ, 
Paris, 1972, 360. 
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light-beam which every understanding can cast upon a matter" 
(1927, NC, II, 47).16 Ors appreciates intelligence which displays its 
knowledge without demonstrating it. Ihis facility he calls the "ge-
nius of pure presentation", comparable to light. Putting forth the 
evidence ("evidencia") evinces c1airvoyance ("videncia") (1927, 
NC, II, 162). Ors struggles to illumine his countrymen, world, and 
era, and calls such strife the Heliomaquia, the solar struggle. 17 In 
this campaign, he exalts superficiality at the expense of depth. Just 
aS Berkeley, paraphrased by Bergson, de nies that matter has an in-
side, an underside, or a content, so Ors insists that "the eternity of 
things is precisely their form, not that inner ghost which our fool-
hardiness causes us to judge worthy of the name of spirit" .IK Berg-
son's Berkeley calls material objects "ideas", whose being is 
exhausted in their appearance; if those "ideas" hold nothing with-
in themselves, they can yield no general abstractions. Each con-
crete "idea" provides at most a mere "word" ("mot": Bergson, 
1354). Analogously, Ors asserts, "In the b;ginning was Appear-
ance".'" He equates idea s to the words meant to express them, and 
he views knowing as tantamount to speaking (1920, NC, I, 348-9). 
Since knowledge requires articulation, Ors denounces Eas-
tern mystics who f1ee as enemies oflight to solitude and lack of un-
derstanding. He deems understanding man's first duty, and bein:g 
understood his second. Everything beyond understanding, as Ors 
puts it, poisons, while individuals abstaining from dialogue poi-
16 " ... deja pasar, sin intromisión opaca, el rayo de luz que cada entendimien-
to puede proyectar sobre una materia". 
17 Luis ]iménez Moreno, "El saber estético-lúdico de Eugenio d'Ors", in Ac-
tas del III Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía Española, 383. 
18 " ••• la eternidad de las casas es su forma precisamente, no aquel fantasma in-
terior a quien temerariamente hemos adjudicada el nombre de espíritu". 
19 "En un principio era la Apariencia". Here Ors plays on the word "princi-
pia", meaning "beginning" and "first principIe" (as in the expression "in princi-
pIe"). 
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son themselves (1920, NC, I, 236). We recall the p01sonous 
Oriental flute attributed by Ors to Bergson, avowed anti-intellec-
tualist. In L'Évolution créatrice intelligence is seen as an organ for 
mastering matter, an organ adapted to the form of matter itself. 
Language, allowing intelligence to broaden its domain, has the 
sole purpose of denoting things. Only the mobility of words al-
lows intelligence to reify beings which are not things, but which 
await verbalization to pass from the shadows to the light. Even 
when not operating on matter, intelligence behaves as if it were, 
applying to whatever it touches forms proper to inorganic mate-
rial. This application receives expression in the terms "c1arity" and 
"distinctness". Intelligence, therefore, in Bergson's opinion, in 
order to torm a "clear" and "distinct" conception of itself, should 
view itselfas discontinuous, like inorganic matter. Concepts, like 
solids in space, lie fixed outside one another, forming in their to-
tality an "intelligible world". However, when intelligence turns 
toward life, it shows astonishment at what Bergson calls the true 
continuity, the real mobility, and the reciproca I interpenetration 
characterizing creative evolution (630-32). Nevertheless, given 
the mobility oflife, Ors sees philosophy as a motion-picture film 
onto which this movement is projected. The film moves, but is in 
itself a series of static scenes. The philosopher, like a good cinema-
tographer, aspires to capture the portion of eternity Iying in every 
moment (FHTj, 109-10). Hence, without renouncing existence in 
all its instability, Ors the philosopher stresses the value of essence. 
As to the claim that intelligence cannot approach, as intuition 
can, the infinitude oflife, Ors has a ready reply in his doctrine of 
limitation. He recognizes the need to aim without pause toward 
the infinite. But he visualizes infinity contained by limits, like 
Dionysus in the winecup. Acknowledgement of self-limitations 
strikes him as a sign of manhood and maturity; susceptibility to 
the temptation ofevery new possibility, as a symptom of puerility. 
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Besides, philosophy has enough to do in seeking knowledge of 
what seem to be the simplest phenomena oflife. Intelligence, ra-
tionality, and memory necessarily appear in every act of seeing or 
tasting an orange. Ors finds it impossible to see the fruit without 
remembering oranges beforehand, or to taste it without defining 
its shape. 20 
Underlying Ors's taste tor the finite and discreet is a patriotic 
motive, which has impelled him in his doctoral dissertation to 
vindicate intelligence in the face of Bergsonian intuition. Ors, it 
should be underscored, does not aim to banish intuition from 
philosophy, but to consign it to a lover rank with relation to intel-
ligence. Hoping to bring "scientism" to Barcelona, he employs 
Minkowsky's ideas on relativity to refute Bergson in his thesis. 
The refutation has to do with the aporiae of Zen o de Elea, which 
Bergson approaches from the standpoint of his intuitionism and 
Ors from the perspective of his intellectualism. Zeno denies the 
existence of movement: an arrow stays at rest at every instant ofits 
flight and therefore during its whole trajectory. In L'Évolution 
créatice, Bergson replies that one movement alone is a totality, 
which can be a movement between two points of time in which 
the object is at rest. If other moments of rest are intercalated be-
tween those two, the movement ceases to be singulr and divides 
into a plurality of movements. Intelligence operates, as Bergson 
puts it, with a cinematographic method ("méthode cinématogra-
phique", 754). It apprehends the reality of movement as a series of 
static pictures. But intuition, by inserting itself with sympathy 
into the interior of the movement, perceives it as the becoming, 
the devenir, which it is. Hence Bergson rejects the Greek prefer-
ence for the word and the concept vis-à-vis the movement oflife. 
On the other hand, Ors, guided by Minkowsky, argues against 
20 Glosas, 218-20. 
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Bergson that we may unite the notions of space and time instead 
ofkeeping them separate. Let us define an event as an intersection 
between an instant of time and a point in space. We may after-
wards conceive a series of events as a line comprised of many inter-
sections of temporal and spatial points. Each intersection pos-
sesses its own reality, like each note of a symphony written on pa-
per in a series. We thereby join the Greeks in affirming the discon-
tinuity of reality. We rationalize what was previously irrational. 
We synthesize the ideal and the concrete. Finally, we subordinate 
intuition to intelligence (Aranguren, 251). Despite this new order 
of preferences. Ors owes his concep tions ofintelligence and intui-
tion to Bergson. 
This debt to Bergson for the idea of intelligence gives Ors's 
philosophy its main characteristic as pinpointed by Aranguren: it 
is an ethics, a philosophy of praxis (118). We can well understand 
Ors's concentration on practicallife if we recall that he styles him-
self as an intellectualist. Intelligence, we remember, consists for 
Bergson of a means for transferring matter into an instrument for 
human action. He dreams of a "humanité complète et parfaite", 
with fully developed intelligence and intuition, but laments that 
mankind's concentration on mastery of matter has sacrificed in-
tuition to intelligence (721-22). Hence he attempts to reaffirm the 
rights of intuition, while his Catalan student does the reverse, 
reasserting the supremacy of intelligence . Recognizing with Berg-
son the incongruity between reality and the rational image of the 
real, Ors nonetheless calls this image the best part of reality for a 
practical reason: without it, reality would poison man, absorb 
him. Therefore, like the Catholic Church in the face of certain 
demoniacal phenomena, Ors damns irrationality as venomous 
while using intelligence to increase life (FHTj, 49-50). As a result 
he de nies the adage primum vivere, deinde philosophari, because his 
doctrine negates the adverbs primum and deinde: philosophizing 
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takes place at the moment ofliving and seeks the eternal element I 
of that moment (FHTj, 44). This practical outIook affects his own 
philosophy in its point of departure - the complete man, who I 
works and plays - and in its loftiest consequence - mysticism; in 
both instances, moreover, Ors continues his dialogue with the in- . \ 
tuitionist Bergson. I 
Asking at what date man appears on earth, Bergson responds 
that this event takes place with the manufacture or the first uten-
sils or arms. Prehistory would seem to indicate that man's cons-
tant characteristic consists not of knowing, but of making. Berg-
son would substitute the label Homo faber for the usual one of 
Homo sapiens, ref1ecting an excess of pride; for intelligence, seen in 
its primigenious form, is nothing but the faculty for making uten-
sils (611, 613). However, the intellectualist Ors prefers to view 
man not at his beginnings, b,\.lt at the fullness of his being, en-
dowed with Seny . As Luis)iménez Moreno points out (371), Ors 
sees the complete man as Homo sapiens, diversified into Homo fa-
ber and Homo ludens. He can respond to his teacher Bergson that in-
telligence, science, may well be addressed toward action . But ac-
tion bifurcates in to work and play (FHTj, 137). In Ors, saperc, 
fabricare, and ludere, notes Aranguren (213), are three possible 
forms of creating, of mas te ring nature, of acquiring freedom. In 
the endeavor to arrive at the essence of freedom, Ors chooses an 
example from the realm of work, the experience of the woodsman 
in felling a tree. Undoubtedly he writes inspired by Bergson's view 
offreedom as the relationship of a concrete ego to an act it accom-
plishes. In the same context, moreover, the author of the Essai 
sur les données immédiates de la consciencc remarks tInt the relation-
ship of outer causality is merely mathematical, unlike the rela-
tionship of psychic force to the act it produces (143). Hence Ors 
conceives the idea of determining where, in the woodsman's act, 
outer causality ends and ego, i.e., freedom, !:>egins. His analysis re-
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presents a self-conscious application ofintelligence to a problem. 
From Bergson, he has learned that intelligence reifies whatever it 
touches. Therefore, at the point that reification can go no further, 
there lies freedom, selfhood. Neither the woodsman's hatchet, 
nor his han d, his arm, his energy, talent, wishes, sentiments, nor 
even his intelligence itself are the woodsman's being: they are 
things, situated outside his ego and even capable ofhindering his 
eftort under certain circumstances. Like Bergson, who finds the 
free act undefinable - to define this portion of durée réelle would 
be tantamount to identifying it with a symbol ofitself(144)-, Ors 
regards freedom as something irreducible to a psychological or a 
logical definition. It is enough to call it freedom (FHT], 110-13) 
and to determine how to attain it in practicallife. This is the most 
signifIcant lesson which Seny can offer mankind. 
Seny, however, transcends mere intelligence in the Bergson-
ian sense. That ampler faculty of mind instructs Ors that man can 
achieve absolute freedom only by rising above rationality, even 
above consciousness itself. Freedom achieves a relationship with 
itself, to borrow Ors's words/ I through a religious act. To under-
stand the nature of this act, which leads us to the mystic aspect of 
Ors's intellectualism, we must return to Bergson's intuitionism 
for the key. In intuiting the durée réelle of alllife, the author of L 'É-
7Jo!ution créatrice perceives reality in the form of a great impulse or 
é!an vital. Every organism, contemplated from this standpoint, ac· 
cording to]. Theau (429), appears to be a segment detached from 
the current of primal vitality, which endlessly produces indivi-
duals and from time to time new species. Within each individual 
¡ies a portion of é!an 7Jita!, with its need to differentiate new indivi-
21 "How, then, can freedom ¡¡(tain a reIationship with itselr? By means ora re-
ligious Jct" ("¿Cómo, pues, puede la libertad relacionarse consigo misma? Por 
medio de un acto religioso"). QuotcJ from Ullt/ j,Ortl ((III F.u,f;t'IIio d'Ors in Arangu-
ren,214. 
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duals and with its concurrent tendency to gather individuals into 
common species. For this reason in every living being a tendency 
toward individualization coexists with a tendency toward socia-
bility. Hence Ors distinguishes plants, animals, and men by con-
trasting the degrees to which those two ten den cies appear in each 
of the three. Plants lack virtually all individuality; animals present 
individuals coexisting with their species but ruled by the species; 
mankind displays individuals who rule over their species and who 
defy and attempts to substitute other individuals for them. Still, 
by extending his reason to a sphere above reason, Ors can con-
ceive of an individual so singular that it lacks a species . This arche-
type Ors calls an Angel, comprising in itself all possibilities of the 
human species. Union with his Angel, writes Aranguren (156, 
215), defines the mystic aspiration of Eugeni d'Ors. 
Ors's critics, to our knowledge, have never recognized that he 
here follows the example ofBergson. However, he gives Bergson's 
mysticism, based on intuition, a different sign, drawn, as we could 
have predicted, from the intelIigence. In La Pensée et fe mouvant 
(1303), Bergson draws a contrast between two styles of thinking, 
one human ("humain"), the other almost divine ("quasi divin") . 
The first entails the use of concepts; the second, intuition. The 
human mode of thought accepts its place in social intelIectual ha-
bits. It makes use of preexisting ideas as if they were any kind of 
instruments provided by the community. But Bergson evidently 
prefers the other mental style, involving reimmersion in the éfan 
vitafthrough direct intuition ofthat force, which generates the so-
cie ties capable of creating the concepts useful to mere intelIig-
ence. Intuition, in Bergson's opinion, serves the purpose of exor-
cizing philosophical ghosts, insoluble problems, Iike that of the 
origin of being, which uselessly haunt the metaphysician. Now, 
the Catholic Eugeni d'Ors, like his teacher, views himself as a ph i-
losophical exorcist. But the demonic ghosts on which he operates 
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are often the problems posed by Bergson's philosophy itself. On 
the last page of his doctoral thesis, he affirms, 
We ha ve struggled, we are struggling, and we want to keep struggling against the 
ghost ofll1ystcry , against the ghost ofilll/L'r liji'. against the ghost ofthe IIIICOI/SeiO/lS, 
against the ghost of the il/elfablt'. The present thesis is an episode of the parallel 
battle against il/jil/itism and (ol/lil/llit)1 (Aranguren , 257)21 
Yet, in both the cases ofBergson and Ors, the two extremes meet: 
neither Bergson, despite his protest noted above, desires to exor-
cize the ghost ofthe origin ofbeing, nor Ors the problem of mys-
tery, of the infinite. 
Otherwise, ecstasy could hardly have any place in the intui-
tionism of Bergson and in the Heliomaquia of Ors. In Les Deux 
sources de la morale el de la re/igion, Bergson describes a mystic expe-
rience in which the writer (Bergson himself?) comes to discover 
the first principIe oflife, the élan vital. The writer rises from the in-
tellectual and social plane to a point in his own sou I which ema-
nates an imperative to create, a need felt in all its fullness only 
once in a lifetime. This impulse arises from depth of objects them-
selves. Verbalization of such an experience requires great effort, 
with failure probable (1191). As between animal instinct, intui-
tion, and intelligence, Bergson finds intuition the faculty capable 
of illumining the roots of man's being and the principie oflife in 
general. The mystic's soul, Bergson remarks, may well contain the 
same illumination (1187). Ors, however, distinguishes various 
forms of mysticism, the type which discovers the center and sym-
21 "Hemos luchado, luchamos y queremos luchar aún contra el fantasma del 
misterio, contra el fantasma de la vida intaior, contra el fantasma de lo inconscientL', 
contra el fantasma de lo illefab/c. La presente tesis es un episodio de la b .ltalla para-
lela contra el injinitis1l/0 y la contill/lidad". 
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bol of mystery, emotion, and ineffability in darkness, and the 
kind which encounters all this in the sun. Mystics of sunshine 
may, if they abdicate theÏí intelligence, let themselves be dazzled 
by the rays; but the application ofintelligence can convert the sun 
into an "instrument ofillumination" (1921, NC, l, 541). Here ap-
pears a new variation on the Bergsonian theme ofintelligence as a 
faculty for reifying the universe . The reification, though, acquires 
in Ors the nuance of creativity which illumination through intui-
tion acquired in Bergson. But the philosopher of Sen.y lays greater 
emphasis than Bergson on active participation in the creation. 
Mystic contemplation for the Catholic monk or the Catholic phi-
losopher, in Ors's opinion, requires effort. rhe contemplator 
must attain to the concrete figure of the object ofhis devotion by 
separating that object from everything else. This "figurative" 
reckoning places contemplation in the realm of"poetics", the sci-
ence of creation (1945, NOC, 533-34). The object contemplated 
becomes a work of art. At the sam e time, the contemplator expe-
riences ecstasy. Whereas in Bergson intuition transports the wri-
ter to the source of the temporal f1ow, in Ors intelligence lifts him 
above tim e to the eternal wor!d of Platonic ldeas, of archetypes. 
Still, the discursive tides of Bergson's intuitions never ebb in his 
prose; while, as Aranguren suggests (152), Ors's discontinuous 
glosses are capable of fragmenting into mystic babbling like the 
following: 
Fatality sought to make me a land-dwelling mammal, nothing more. I want to be a 
fish , I want to be a bird . I yearn for the ai r and the sea for myself as well . Correc-
tion . There migh t still be a more arbitrary, loftier sport... That ofbecoming reju-
venated (1921, NC, I, 510-11)2\ 
Lj "La fatalidad pretendía hacer de mí un mamífera terragueo no mas. Yo 
guiera ser pez, yo guiera ser ave. Anhelo, también para mí, el aire y el mar. Rect ifi-
co . Habría aún algún deporte mas arbitraria. mas elevada ... El de rejuvenecerse". 
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Hovering above time like a bird, immersed like a fish in a sea of 
light, united with his Angel, Ors feels eternally young. 
In the foregoing study, we have observed that too many like-
nesses exist between the mentalstyles ofBergson and Ors to make 
one simply the refutation or reverse ofthe other. We have pointed 
out the mixture offascination and fear which Bergson's intuition-
ism inspires in Ors; the parallels in their philosophical goals and 
methods; the significant roles played by intuition and intelligence 
in the philosophies ofboth; Bergson's influence on Ors's concep-
tlOn ofboth these faculties; Bergson's presence in Ors's point of 
departure, the complete man who works and plays; and the mys-
ticism crowning the thought of both philosophers. Without a 
doubt the comparison between Bergson and Ors should be pur-
sued in all the cognitive fields they share. As long as varioU5 of 
Ors's early major discursive works remain unpublished in Barce-
lona, an important key to his published production lies in compa-
rative analyses with Bergson's. Here, we have merely taken a first 
step toward indicating a research route for others better informed 
about Ors, whether they choose an intuitionist's path like Berg-
son's of whether they prefer, as we do, to accompany Ors himself 
on the biways of intellectualism. 
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